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ABSTRACT

[7, 8,
8, 9,
9, 10,
10, 11,
11, 12,
12, 13,
13, 14,
14, 15,
15,
Virtual coordinate systems [7,
1.71 have been proposed as a low communication cost ser16, 17]
16,
vice to accurately predict latencies between arbitrary hosts
in a network. These systems allow a node to map itself
virtual coordinate based on a small number of actual
to a virtual
network distance estimates to a subset of reference nodes.
By comparing the virtual coordinates, nodes can trivially
estimate the latency between them.
Two main architectures for virtual coordinate systems
have emerged: landmark-based and decentralized. Landmarkbased systems rely on infrastructure components (such as a
set of landmark servers)
servers) to predict distance between any
two hosts. The set of landmarks can be pre-determined [7,
[7,
11,
161 or randomly selected [9,
[9, 17].
171. Decentralized virtual
11, 16]
coordinate systems do not rely on explicitly designated infrastructure components,
components, requiring any node in the system
to act as a reference node. Examples of decentralized virtual coordinate systems include PIC [12],
[12], Vivaldi [10],
[lo], and
PCoord [15,
[15, 18].
181.
The accuracy and stability of virtual coordinate systems
rely on the assumption that the reference set nodes on which
relies on are altruistic
the virtual coordinate computation relies
[19]
[19] and correctly participate in the system.
system. Under this assumption,
sumption, many of the proposed systems have been shown
to be accurate,
accurate, often achieving an overall latency prediction
error ofless
[lo, 15].
151. While this assumption
of less than ten percent [10,
may be ensured for landmark-based virtual coordinate syssystems by securing the small set of infrastructure nodes, it is
not easily achieved for decentralized systems where any node
can act as a reference node for other nodes in the system. As
a result, decentralized virtual coordinate systems are vulner[20, 211
able to insider attacks [20,
21] conducted by attackers that
infiltrate such systems or compromise some of their nodes.
Since virtual coordinate systems are network services
services providing support for a wide variety of peer-to-peer
peer-to-peer applications
and more recently routing [22],
[22], they would likely be a prime
candidate for attack. It is critical that such systems are designed to be robust to attackers that influence the accuracy
of the coordinates.
Previous work focused
focused very little on mitigating vulnerabilities of virtual coordinate systems with the notable exception
[12],which uses the triangle inequality to detect malicious
of [12],
nodes. The results based on synthetic networks presented in
[12]
[12] show that the method does improve the accuracy of the
PIC coordinate system in adversarial networks. However,
However,
as shown in [23,
123, 24,
251 violations of the triangle equality
24, 25]
are very frequent for real networks, resulting in the inaccuracy and fragility of virtual coordinate systems even when

Virtual coordinate systems provide an accurate and efficient
allows hosts on the Internet to determine the
service that allows
latency to arbitrary hosts without actively monitoring all
nodes in the network. Many of the proposed virtual coordinate systems were designed with the assumption that
all of the nodes in the system are altruistic. However,
However, this
assumption may be violated by compromised nodes acting
maliciously to degrade the accuracy of the coordinate system. As numerous peer-to-peer applications rely on virtual
coordinate systems to achieve good performance, it is critical to address the security of such systems.
In this work, we demonstrate the vulnerability of decentralized virtual coordinate systems to insider (or Byzantine)
attacks. We propose techniques to make the coordinate asassignment robust to malicious attackers without increasing
the communication cost. We demonstrate the attacks and
mitigation techniques in the context of a well-known distributed virtual coordinate system using simulations based
on three representative, real-life Internet topologies of hosts
(RTT).
and corresponding round trip times (RTT).

1. INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
1.
A wide range of applications taking advantage of peerto-peer systems have emerged in recent years, including file
(e.g. BitTorrent [1],
[I], Emule [2]),
[2]),
download and distribution (e.g.
voice over IP (e.g. Skype [3]),
[3]), and video broadcasting (e.g.
(e.g.
ESM [4],
[4], Coolstreaming [5]).
[5]). Many of these applications
optimize their performance based on network topology. For
example, the construction of multicast trees or the selection
of a replica for file
file sharing applications can be greatly improved by taking advantage of network locality.
locality. One basic
approach to learn network locality is to probe all hosts in
the network to determine attributes such as latency. The
cost associated with active monitoring to estimate such at61, being exacerbated by the
tributes is non-negligible [4,
[4, 6],
presence of multiple applications performing this task on a
common network infrastructure.
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nodes without using fixed infrastructure nodes. Although
each specific virtual coordinate system differs in some details, most of them follow a common design. The most
important characteristics that define a decentralized coor(1) the reference or neighbor set,
set, (2)
dinate systems are (1)
(2) the
distance prediction mechanism, and (3) the error minimization technique.
In a decentralized virtual coordinate system,
system, each node
calculates its coordinates based on the information obtained
from a small set of nodes in the network, which we refer to
as the reference set. There are several methods used to select the reference set, with identifying a set of close and set
of distant network nodes and selecting a random subset of
each being one of the most promising [10,
[lo, 12].
121. Nodes may
have different reference sets. Different systems use different sizes of the reference set due to the frequency of acmeasurements, the number of nodes queried
tual network measurements,
per measurement interval,
interval, and the error minimization technique utilized. For example,
example, Vivaldi uses a reference set size
[20], PCoord uses 10
10 nodes [18],
[18], and PIC uses
of 64 nodes [20],
32 nodes [12].
[12].
Once a reference set has been selected,
selected, a node determines its coordinate based on a predefined distance premechanism, such as the Euclidean distance. Each
diction mechanism,
system typically maintains coordinates in either low dimensional (usually 2 to 8 dimensions) Euclidean space [12],
[12], an
[lo], or non-Euclidean
augmented Euclidean space [10],
non-Euclidean (e.g. hy[29]. In general, it has been shown that
perbolic) space [29].
none of the embedding spaces dominates the others in performance
[30] and lower dimensionality Euclidean spaces are
formance [30]
[lo]. A node determines its position and then
often sufficient [10].
successively refines it by periodically querying nodes in its
reference set. Queried nodes respond with metrics that can
include local error, perceived system error,
coordinates,
error, local coordinates,
and RTT.
Virtual coordinate systems provide accurate latency prediction, achieved through error minimization techniques of
a chosen distance error function. Examples include:
•a Generic multi-dimensional minimization
minimization designed ttoo minimize a relative system error measure (such as logarithmic
transformed error)
error) using techniques such as the downhill
(121.
simplex method [12].
•a Minimizing coordinates by simulating Newtonian mechanas a particle influics.
ics. Each node in the system is simulated as
enced by the field force induced between nodes. Each pair of
particles (nodes)
(nodes) either pulls or repulses each other, thereby
[29].
reducing the total system error [29].
•a Minimizing coordinates by simulating spring relaxation,
where the state of the springs at
a t rest is the optimal embedding. The system minimizes the squared system error by
iteratively finding the low-energy point of the spring-based
spring-based
system [10].
[lo].
While each technique has benefits, systems based on multidimensional minimization are often slow to
t o converge, sensitive to initial system conditions, and sensitive ttoo high error
measurements. Simulation techniques such as spring relaxation are computationally inexpensive, less sensitive ttoo high
error nodes, and more amenable ttoo general decentralized
system design.
In general, virtual coordinate systems achieve the overall goals of accuracy and stability while reducing traffic by
as much as two orders of magnitude when compared with
[12]. Systems such as
active monitoring to estimate RTT [12].

deployed in non-adversarial networks. Previous work [20,
(20,
21] also pointed out the susceptibility of Vivaldi to attacks,
211
attacks,
without proposing any solution.
In this paper, we study the vulnerability of decentralized
virtual coordinate systems to insider attacks and propose
mechanisms to make the accuracy of such systems resilient
to attacks. To the best of our knowledge, we provide the
first solution for mitigating attacks against virtual coordinate systems that is based on realistic assumptions about
network topology and demonstrate its effectiveness using
real-life Internet data sets. Our solution does not increase
the communication in the system, complying with the virtual coordinate system design goal of maintaining a low communication cost. We summarize our key contributions:
systems,
•a We classify attacks against virtual coordinate systems,
coordinates, as coordinate inflabased on the impact on the coordinates,
tion, deflation,
deflation, and oscillation. The attacks are conducted
by insiders that infiltrated the virtual coordinate system or
compromised some of the nodes. The low-rate nature of the
(i.e. they do not require the attacker to generate a
attacks (I.e.
noticeable amount of traffic) makes them difficult to detect,
while their epidemic nature makes them very dangerous as
a small number of attackers can significantly influence the
accuracy of the system.
•a We propose techniques to reduce incorrect coordinate mappings by using spatial and temporal correlations to perform
context-sensitive outlier analysis. A key component of our
solution is based on the observation that the behavior of
the attacker can be constrained by correlating dependent
metrics.
•a We demonstrate the impact of the attacks and the effectiveness of our defense mechanisms through p2psim [26J
fectiveness
(261
simulations,
well-studied Vivaldi virsimulations, in the context of the well-studied
system[lO] using three representative realtual coordinate system[10]
world topologies of hosts and corresponding RTTs: King
[13], Meridian [27],
[27], and AMP [28].
[28]. We found through ana[13],
lytical and empirical studies that a spatial threshold of 1.5
1.5
and a temporal threshold of 4.0 provided a low system error
under attack while maintaining an acceptable false positive
rate. Our experiments also show that the method starts to
degrade when the coalition size of malicious nodes in the
reference set of a node increases over 30% of the reference
set size.
size.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
follows: We provide
an overview of decentralized virtual coordinate systems and
attacks against them in Section 2. We propose mitigation
mechanisms in Section 3. We present experimental results
demonstrating the impact of the attacks and the effectiveness of our solutions
solutions in Section 4. We discuss related work
6.
in Section 5 and conclude our work in Section 6.

2. ATTACKS AGAINST VIRTUAL COORDINATE SYSTEMS
In this section,
section, we give an overview of the main components of decentralized virtual coordinate systems and d
de-e
scribe how they can be exploited by attackers to influence
their accuracy.
accuracy.

2.1 Decentralized Virtual Coordinate Systems
The design goal of decentralized virtual coordinate systems is to efficiently create and maintain a stable set of virtual coordinates that accurately predict the latency between
2

Vivaldi [10],
[lo], PCoord [15],
[15], and PIC [12]
[12] stabilize at an avermilliseconds for
age system latency estimation error of ten milliseconds
large scale simulations and deployments.

system can include isolating subsets of nodes from
from the network, creating general disorder in the system,
system, and rendering
the coordinate system unusable due to high estimation error.
We refer to attacks which result in nodes not converging to a
virtual coordinate and continuously changing their positions
as coordinate
coordinate oscillation.
While all of the attacks have different
different goals,
goals, in the end,
end,
they all distort the coordinate space and can make using the
computed coordinates worse than using randomly assigned
coordinates. Even short-lived,
short-lived, localized attacks have a longlasting effect on the overall
overall system. For example,
example, even when
a single victim node is displaced from its correct position,
this has an epidemic,
epidemic, detrimental effect on many of the nodes
in the system as the victim node will push/pull nodes away
from their correct coordinates by reporting its now incorrect
coordinates. That is because a correct node that computed
its coordinates based on incorrect information may serve as
a reference
reference set for other nodes in the system, thus negatively
influencing
com~utation. Besides degraddenad- their coordinate computation.
ing the accuracy of the coordinate system, the attacks will
also adversely impact any application using the coordinate
system to estimate network measurements. In addition,
addition, as
the attacks exploit the semantics of the information contained on the packet, they do not add a noticeable change
in traffic load and thus are difficult
difficult to detect by traditional
mechanisms.

2.2 Attacker Model
We consider a constrained-collusion
constrained-collusion Byzantine adversary
model similar to that proposed in [31],
[31], with a system size of
N
N and a bounded percentage of malicious nodes f (0:::::
(0 5 f < 1)
1)
behaving arbitrarily. The set of malicious nodes may colcollude. We assume a malicious adversary has access
access to all
data at a node as any legitimate user would (insider access),
access),
including cryptographic keys stored at a node. This access
access
can be the result of the adversary bypassing the authentication mechanisms or compromising a node through other
means. Nodes cannot be completely trusted although they
are authenticated. We assume that data authentication and
integrity mechanisms are deployed and we focus
focus only on attacks directed at the accuracy of the virtual coordinates.
coordinates.

-

2.3 Attacks
Attacks Description
Description
The correct operation of virtual coordinate systems is dede
pendent on the assumption that the reference set nodes are
altruistic and respond with correct metrics to any query
from any node computing its corresponding coordinates.
coordinates. An
attacker controlling reference set nodes has the ability to influence
fluence the coordinate maintenance process by manipulatingthe information, such as remote node error and coordinates,
coordinates,
returned in response to a quely.
query. By blindly accepting this
malicious information, a correct node computes incorrect
coordinates.
A malicious node is able to indirectly take advantage of
the error minimization techniques and chosen error function
by manipulating the metrics it reports as a reference set
node. In doing so,
so, an attacker is able to make a victim node
move away from its correct position by either pushing the
node away from or pulling it closer to the malicious
malicious node's
reported coordinates. For example,
example, a malicious node can
attract a victim node towards a random position and away
from the victim's correct position by reporting false
false virtual
coordinates and a low error. Also,
Also, since many of the minimization techniques rely on the measured RTT of queries,
a malicious node can push a victim node away from
from itself
by delaying its query responses. The larger the induced
delay,
delay, the farther the victim node will re-calculate its positions away from the malicious node's reported coordinates
to possibly more erroneous locations. An attacker may also
take advantage of the error minimization techniques to repel a victim node away from
from specific
specific virtual coordinates by
making its queried responses appear worse than actuality
by advertising coordinates with high error. We refer to such
attacks that result in coordinate mappings farther from
from the
correct location as coordinate inflation.
inflation.
An attacker may cause a victim node to remain immoimmobile by reporting positions similar to the current position of
that victim node. A malicious node may also report false
false
coordinates where the distance between the victim and the
attacker reflects the RRT between the nodes, once again
rendering the victim immobile. We refer to such attacks in
which the victim nodes are prevented from performing necessary,
coordinate deflation.
essary, correct coordinate changes as coordinate
deflation.
Any attack against the coordinate system may target a
particular node, subset of nodes, or region of the coordinate space. The final goal of manipulating the coordinate

3.

LEVERAGING OUTLIER DETECTION
TO ADD ROBUSTNESS
ROBUSTNESS TO VIRTUAL
VIRTUAL COCOORDINATE
ORDINATE SYSTEMS
SYSTEMS

In this section,
section, we discuss how techniques used in network security can be used in the context of virtual coordinate systems to make them more robust to attacks from
from
compromised nodes.
nodes. As such systems were proposed with
the intention to decrease the communication cost involved
in active monitoring, our goal is to propose mitigation techniques that do not add any communication to the system.
We propose to prevent incorrect coordinate updates by detecting and filtering out outliers in the metrics reported by
queried nodes. Our method evaluates temporal and spatial
correlations among data in the system. Below,
Below, we provide
an overview of outlier detection and describe how we apply
it to virtual coordinate systems.

3.1 Overview
Overview of Outlier
Outlier Detection
The usability of a data set and the quality of statistical
measures derived from it are integrally related to the number
of outliers present. Outliers are data points which deviate
so much from the rest of the data set as to arouse suspicion
331.
that they were generated by a different mechanism [32, 33].
The identification of outliers can lead to discovering
discovering important trends and information,
information, such as the presence of malicious activities.
activities. Outlier detection, also known as anomaly
or deviation detection, has been used in a variety of different
fields
351, fraud detection
fields including intrusion detection [34, 35],
[36],
[36], medical analysis [37],
[37], and business trend analysis [38].
[38].
Many of the techniques for outlier detection utilize a statistical based or distance-based approach in which an outlier
is any point which lies beyond a specified
sbkcified distance threshold.
The Euclidean,
Euclidean. Manhattan,
Manhattan. Minkowski,
Minkowski, and Mahalanobis
distance functions
functions are the most commonly used functions
functions in
determining distance [37,
[37, 39],
391, each having its own benefits

3

ceives an observation tuple which consists of <remote error,
ceives
coordinates, latency>. The node records
change in remote coordinates,
this response and tracks the most recent u
u updates in a
queue-like fashion,
fashion, where the oldest responses are replaced
by newer ones and u is equal to the size of the reference set.
Unlike more message-intensive
message-intensive distributed systems where a
new set of responses from
from all nodes queried (in this case
nodes in the reference set)
set) are collected in response to one
query 14]'
(41, virtual coordinate systems collect these responses
sequentially. Our approach requires a node to perform outreceives a new tuple, considering
lier detection every time it receives
u updates. We highlight that this technique
the most recent u
is an instance of spatial outlier detection since we examine
metrics across various system nodes and not time.
Once a node receives
receives an observation tuple, the node first
computes the centroid of the data set consisting of obseru updates. The node then
vation tuples from
from the stored u
computes the Mahalanobis distance between the received
[40]:
observation tuple and the centroid as follows
follows [40]:

given the type of analysis being performed.
Malicious
Malicious activity can lead to spatial and temporal inconsistencies. Spatial outlier detection identifies observations
which are inconsistent with their surrounding neighbors,
while temporal outlier detection identifies inconsistencies in
the metrics of the observation space of a system over time.
The use of both temporal and spatial outlier detection alallows for the identification
identification of multiple types of attacks with
better accuracy than either alone.

3.2 Applying Outlier Detection
Detection in Virtual CoCoordinate Systems
Systems
ordinate
We leverage techniques from outlier detection to identify
malicious behavior and take defensive
defensive actions to mitigate its
effects. Instead of allowing
allowing malicious coordinate mappings
effects.
to occur and then trying to detect them, we focus
focus on reducing the likelihood of a node computing incorrect coordinates
through the use of statistical outlier detection. Since the evidence of malicious activity is distributed across space and
time, we propose to detect them using both temporal and
spatial correlations among metrics in the system.
Each node independently performs outlier detection before
fore changing its coordinate in order to identify and filter
out outliers in the received metrics. Spatial outlier detection compares the recently received metrics from
from each of the
queried nodes in a node's reference set and forces
forces a node
to report metrics consistent with what other reference peers
are currently reporting. Temporal outlier detection examines the consistency of the metrics received from an individual queried node over time and forces
forces a node to report
metrics consistent with what it has reported in the past.
cost, we use metrics alTo avoid adding communication cost,
reference set. We use
ready reported by the nodes in the reference
the 3-tuple of <remote error, change in remote coordinates,
coordinates,
latency> to generate the spatial outlier statistics and the
5-tuple of <remote error, local error,
error, latency,
latency, change in remote coordinates,
coordinates, change in local
local coordinates> to generate
the temporal outlier statistics. The metrics were chosen
on the basis that while each of them represents a different
measure of system performance, changes in one measure will
result in a correlated change in other metrics. For example,
example,
stabilizes to low overall error, the local eras the system stabilizes
ror reported by each node and correlated magnitude of the
change in coordinates will both change less.
less. An attacker
must therefore report a high error with greatly changing coordinates in order to not be identified as malicious.
malicious. Our
forces an attacker to lie consistently with other
solution also forces
peers. This is difficult
difficult to achieve as an attacker does not
have perfect knowledge of the observation space,
space, must accurately predict the random subset of reference
reference nodes that
will be queried, and only has a finite amount of time to
coordinate with other attackers.
attackers.
Our approach uses the Mahalanobis [40]
[40] distance to detect outliers. We selected this distance function because it
has been shown effective
effective at detecting outliers with multiple
[41], scales each variable based on its standard
attributes [41]'
deviation and covariance,
covariance, and takes into account how the
measured attributes change in relation to each other [42].
[42].

d(x, if)

= J((x - if)TC-I(X - if))

(1)

where 5
error,
x and ify' are the feature vectors consisting of error,
x is
latency, and distance from
from the last virtual coordinate. Z
y' is the average value
the value from the query response and if
that was calculated. CC-' I is the inverse covariance
covariance matrix
computed from
from the stored observation tuples. Finally, this
distance is compared against a spatial threshold.
threshold. We discuss
Sec. 4.3.
spatial threshold selection in Sec.

3.2.2 Temporal
Temporal outlier detection
We use temporal correlations to detect inconsistencies in
the metrics reported over time by a reference set node. We
use the tuple consisting of <remote error, local error, lalachange in remote coordinates,
coordinates, change in local coordtency, change
inates>. Using incremental learning,
learning, we compute a temporal centroid for each of the members of a node's reference set.
We assume each of the reported metrics is statistically injust the mean,
dependent, necessitating the storage of just
mean, standard deviation, and sample count computed from the received query responses over time. The stored values for a
reference set member are incrementally updated with the
metrics received from that member's query response, simi1401, using the technique described in [43].
[43]. In order to
lar to [40],
compare newly received values with the temporal centroid,
we use the "simplified Mahalanobis distance" presented in
[40]:
[40]:
n-1
n-I
(2)
d ( ~ , y==
) l)lxi
E ( l x i -- Yil/(cJi
&I/(& +
+ aa))
))
d(x,y)
(2)
i=o
i=O
where n is the number of metrics, five
five in our case (remote
(remote
error,
error, local error, latency, change in remote coordinates, and
change in local coordinates), cJi
fi is the standard deviation,
deviation,
.001 to help
and aa is a smoothing factor empirically set to .001
to avoid over-fitting and reduce false
false positives [40].
[40]. Once
a query response is received,
received, the latest observation tuple is
compared with the corresponding temporal centroid using
the simplified
simplified Mahalanobis distance,
distance, based on a temporal
threshold that decides
decides if the tuple is an outlier or not. We
Sec. 4.3.
discuss temporal threshold selection in Sec.

3.2.1 Spatial outlier detection

3.2.3 Spatio-temporal outlier detection

We use spatial outlier detection to examine the consisconsistency of recently received metrics from queried nodes. A
node queries a random node from
from its reference set and re-

We combine the two outlier detection mechanisms de[44].
scribed above by using a codebook technique similar to [44].
Each reference set node response that is not a spatial or
4

temporal outlier is
is utilized in updating the receiver node's
coordinates.
coordinates. If
If the reference
reference node is found
found to be an outlier,
lier, the
the query response will
will not be used in future
future temporal
centroid
centroid calculations since
since it will
will not be incorporated into
the
the temporal
temporal mean,
mean, temporal
temporal standard deviation,
deviation, or sample
count.
count. Also,
Also, it will
will not be used in future
future spatial centroid
calculations
calculations since
since it will be dropped from
from the most recent uu
updates.

the virtual coordinate system to form a structure in which
nodes with small RTTs between them converge into clusl(a). The average RTT of
of Meridian
ters, as seen in Fig. l(a).
is approximately half
half that of
of King since it contains many
1(b )
nodes a short distance from one another, as seen in Fig. l(b)
forms fewer,
fewer, but larger clusters. The fiwhere the system forms
nal data set, AMP, was used since it represents a smaller,
high speed system, such as a corporate network. In AMP,
lOOms
of all links, relooms or less links account for nearly 90% of
sulting in one main cluster, as seen in Fig. l(c).
l(c). We do not
consider synthetic topologies
topologies since they do not capture imof the triangle
triangle
portant network properties such as violations of
inequality.
of attacks on
In order to quantitatively compare the effect of
the accuracy of the system, we evaluate two error metrics:
System prediction error is defined as
System
Errorpred =
= ~
IActRTT
-T ES~RTTI
EstRTTI
(3)
Error,,,d
A C ~ RT
(3)
ActRTT is the actual measured RTT and ES~RTT
EstRTT
where the AC~RTT
is the predicted RTT by the virtual coordinate system. This
of how the overall system is
metric provides an intuition of
performing. The lower the system prediction
prediction error is, the
performing.
predicted RTTs are.
more accurate the predicted
Relative error is defined as
Relative
E
Error attack
(4)
rrOrrel = Errorno_attack

4.
4. EXPERIMENTAL
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In
In this
this section we
we demonstrate
demonstrate the impact of attacks against
virtual
virtual coordinate
coordinate systems
systems through simulations based on
real-life
real-life Internet
Internet topologies.
topologies. In addition,
addition, we demonstrate
that our
our proposed mechanisms
mechanisms enhance
enhance the robustness of decentralized
centralized virtual coordinate systems to such attacks.
attacks. We
examine
examine their effect
effect on
on aa representative decentralized virtual
[lo], which is simulated in
tual coordinate system,
system, Vivaldi
Vivaldi [10],
the
1261. We
We selected Vivaldi to demondemonthe p2psim simulator [26].
strate
strate the
the attacks
attacks and defense
defense mechanisms
mechanisms because it is a
mature system,
system, conceptually easy to understand and visualize,
alize, and
and has been shown
shown to produce low error embeddings
[10].
1101.

4.1
4.1 Evaluation
Evaluation Methodology
We
We use
use three different
different RTT data sets
sets collected
collected from
from reallife
life Internet
Internet topologies.
topologies. Table 11 and Fig.l
Fig.1 summarize the
characteristics
characteristics of each
each data set.
set. The data sets are:
are:

ErrOrattack is the system prediction
prediction error measured
where Errorattack
in the presence of
of malicious
malicious nodes and Err0rn0_,ttack
Errorno_attack is the
system prediction error without
without malicious nodes. This metcoordinate
ric captures the impact an attacker has on the coordinate
system. A relative error greater than one indicates a degradation in accuracv
accuracy and a value less than one indicates a
better estimation accuracy than the baseline.
5th , 50~'"
50 th , and 95t'"
95t/'
For each of the error measures, the 5th,
percentile error are analyzed. These values are obtained
by selecting the corresponding entries from a sorted array
of prediction error and are averaged over multiple simulation runs. Intuitively, the 5th
5th percentile represents low error
error
th
nodes, the 5oth
50 percentile corresponds to average or median
error nodes, and the 95th
95 th percentile represents high error
error
nodes.
We ran one million tick long simulations, using the King
data set as our default topology unless otherwise noted. The
nodes join
join in a flash-crowd
flash-crowd scenario in which all nodes join
join
simultaneously and are each initially placed at the origin of
of
the logical coordinate space. Each node proceeds independently of other nodes in the network and chooses a reference set of 64 nodes using the Vivaldi method where half
half
of the nodes are selected as the closest nodes based on network latencv
latency and the rest are selected at random. All other
Vivaldi parameters such as the adaptive timestep were initialized to the optimal values discussed in [lo].
[10]. Each of
of
the experiments utilizes a two-dimensional coordinate space
{(x,y)
lx,y E [-300000,300000]).
{(x,
y )Ix,
[-300000,300000]}. Every simulation was run
ten times with the reported metrics average over all of
of the
simulation.

The King
King data set contains the pair-wise RTT
• King: The
of 1740
[13].
1740 nodes
nodes measured using
using the King method [13].
The Meridian data set,
set, obtained from
from the
• Meridian: The
Cornell
Cornell Meridian project [27],
[27], contains the pair-wise
RTT
RTT of 2500
2500 nodes measured using
using the King method
[13].
[131.
The AMP
AMP data set,
set, collected
collected from
from the NLANR
• AMP: The
Active Measurement Project [28]
1281 on March 1,
1, 2007,
2007,
contains complete
complete information for
for 90
90 high-speed nodes
contains
America.
contained mostly in North America.

1: Data
D a t a Sets
Sets Characteristics
Characteristics
Table l'
Data Set # Nodes
Avg.
Max.
Std. Dev.
RTT
RTT
RTT
1740
King
180ms
800ms
66ms
Meridian
2500
80ms
1000ms
69ms
AMP
AMP
70ms
453ms
90
51ms

(a) King
King
(a)

(b) Meridian
(b)

(c) AMP
(c)

1: Node
N o d e placement chosen by Vivaldi for varFigure 1:
ious data
d a t a sets
sets
ious

4.2 Attacks Against Distributed Virtual Coordinate Systems
In this section we demonstrate several attacks against
against the
Vivaldi coordinate system. Vivaldi was designed to tolerate
high-error, benign nodes,
nodes, but it has no built-in
built-in mechanisms
to defend against malicious
malicious nodes.
Inflation aand
n d deflation attacks. We first demonstrate

We selected the King
King and Meridian
Meridian data sets
sets because they
We
are representative
representative of larger scale
scale peer-to-peer systems,
systems, and
are
were used in validating many virtual coordinate systems.
systems.
were
They have very different
different data characteristics. The King
data set
set contains
contains aa variety of link latencies, allowing
allowing nodes in
data
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3: Relative error
e r r o r under different percentages of attackers (King)
Figure 3:

attack, where the attackers send the vicdepicts an inflation attack,
tim node chosen coordinates along with an artificially high
RTT by delaying query responses. Note the square in the
upper right quadrant representing the victim node forced
forced to
move away from the origin and towards a location chosen by
the attacker.
4(a), the attacks
attacker. As it can be seen in the Table 4(a),
greatly increase the prediction error of the victim node from
from
lOms to 60ms for the deflation attack and to 70ms for the
10ms
inflation attack.

how a coalition of f=30% malicious nodes can target one particular victim node and conduct an inflation or a deflation
attack. Note that the actual number of attackers which directly influence the victim is the number of malicious nodes
reference set of the victim
that are selected to be in the reference
node. Using the hypergeometric distribution, we can determine the probability of having a given number of malicious
malicious
If we let k represents the number of
reference set members. If
malicious nodes in a reference set,
N be number of nodes in
set, N
D is the total number of malicious nodes,
nodes, and n
the system, D
is the size of the reference set,
set, then the probability of having
exactly k malicious nodes in a reference
reference set is given by

(3
):I:(
k' N
N ,D
D , n )) =
(f)
C~=f)
ff((k;
, "
n =
(~)

Pred. Error
Attack
10 ms
None
Deflation
60 ms
Inflation
70 ms
w/defense I
11 ms
wjdefense
11
(a) PredIctIOn
Prediction Error
(a)

(5)

(5)
(3
By summing the discrete probability distributions for given
k, we can determine the probability of having a cervalues of k,
tain percentage of malicious nodes in reference set. In the
set, given that 30% of the total nodes are maKing data set,
licious,
licious, the probability that at least 30% of the nodes in
a reference
reference set (about 20 nodes) are also
also malicious is only
about 35%.
35%.
Fig. 4 presents the location and associated prediction error of a victim node under non-attack conditions and under
attacks. The correct location of the victim node is
the two attacks,
attack, note
in the upper left quadrant. For the deflation attack,
the circle
circle at the origin representing a victim node which
did not move to its correct position.
position, In this scenario, the
attackers send the victim node coordinates that minimize
the difference
difference between the actual RTT and estimated RTT
(the
(the Euclidean distance between the attacker and victim).
As a result, the victim stays at its current coordinate while
4(b) also
believing it has a very low estimation error.
error. Fig. 4(b)

\

1

*

(b)
(b) Node Placement
Figure 4: Victim node error
e r r o r and
a n d placement for a
a n d inflation attack.
deflation and
Oscillation attacks. We demonstrate an oscillation at5. In this scenario, the attacker sends the victim
tack in Fig. 5.
nodes erroneous random positions selected over the coordinate space with a low error value, causing the victim nodes
to make multiple incorrect coordinate changes. As it can be
5(a), the system under non-attack
non-attack conditions
seen in Fig. 5(a),
has an easily identifiable structure in which nodes with small
converge into clusters in the coordinate
RTTs between them converge
5(b),
space. When the system is under attack as seen in Fig. 5(b),
the virtual coordinate system looses its structure and hence
also looses its ability to yield a low error embedding. This
also exemplifies
exemplifies the epidemic nature of such attacks.
attacks.
attack also
6

As
As correct nodes
nodes computing incorrect coordinates
coordinates are later
used
used as
as reference
reference nodes for
for other nodes,
nodes, the entire system
destabilizes.
destabilizes.

6(b)) shows less degradation due to the fact
Meridian (Fig. 6(b))
it has less variation in its link latencies. AMP (Fig. 6(c))
6(c))
shows more variability in the relative error due to its small
size and frequent, large-scale
large-scale node coordinate changes.

4.3 Threshold Selection for Spatial-Temporal
Outlier Detection
of our approach is selecting the temAn important aspect of
poral and spatial thresholds that allow to identify the potentially malicious query responses and eliminate them from the
coordinate computation process. We consider the same atof attackers as in Section 4.2
tack scenario with a percentage of
thresholds
to experimentally determine our outlier detection thresholds
since it is one of the most difficult in which to identify malicious
responses. When a malicious node selects a coordinate
cious responses.
to respond with, the selected coordinate is from a range in
of
which many altruistic nodes reside as well as the majority of
malicious nodes actual coordinates lie within. The malicious
malicious
nodes also report low but variable error inline with low-error
altruistic nodes. These factors help disguise the malicious
nodes actions and make them much harder to detect.
of the method
method proposed
We use a slightly modified version of
in Section 3.2. Specifically,
Specifically, we do not use latency in the outlier detection due to the fact the latencies are predetermined
predetermined
in the simulator and thus show little variability.
Temporal threshold selection. We used a threshold
threshold
of 4.0 for our temporal outlier detection to allow for the
four features:
features: remote error, local error, change in remote
coordinates, and change in local coordinates to vary by at
most one standard deviation over each feature from their
temporally developed
developed mean. The value was chosen based
on the formula of the simplified
simplified Mahalanobis distance as in
[40].
1401.
Spatial threshold selection. The threshold for our outlier detection can be mathematically
mathematically derived as in [45,
[45, 461,
46],
assuming a multivariate Gaussian distribution for the metof equal probability
probability of
of this distribrrics
ic~
vector. The contours of
2-dimensional ellipse and the outlier threshold
threshold
ution create a 2-dimensional
of a vector being within the ellipse
reflects the probability of
semi-axes are determined by k. The probability
probability that
that
whose semi-axes
a random vector lies within the ellipse increases with the
size of k. Thus, for a given value of
of k the probability
probability that a
; computed as:
probed tuple lies within the ellipse can bbe
1
P
+
(6)
p =
= + 2 ( 1 IkeYfdy) - E k e +
(6)

(a)
(a) No
No attack

(b)
(b) Oscillation attack
Figure
Figure 5:
5: Virtual
V i r t u a l coordinate system node placement
under an
a n oscillation
oscillation attack.
Impact of percentage of malicious nodes. We investigate
vestigate the effect
effect of the number of malicious
malicious nodes on
the
the accuracy
accuracy of the system,
system, by varying the percentage of
of
malicious
malicious nodes.
nodes. Each queried malicious
malicious node returns erroneous
roneous metrics
metrics in the form
form of a random position selected
over
100000]) and a
[-100000,100000])
over the coordinates
coordinates {(x,Y)lx,y
{(x, y)lx, y E [-100000,
low,
low, non-zero
non-zero error value.
value. A
A malicious
malicious node also
also randomly
delays
delays its
its response
response between lOOms
looms and 1000ms
lOOOms in order to
induce
induce greater variability in its responses in an attempt to
expand
expand the coordinate space.
space.
Fig.
Fig. 22 presents the
the prediction error for
for the King data set
for
for several
several percentages of malicious
malicious nodes.
nodes. Under non-attack
conditions,
conditions, aa node joining the coordinate system is initially
placed
placed at
at the origin
origin of the logical
logical coordinate space.
space. As time
passes,
passes, each
each node
node receives
receives query responses
responses from
from its reference
set
set and
and is
is able
able to
to refine
refine its position, allowing
allowing the system as
aa whole
whole to
to achieve
achieve lower prediction error.
error. Once the system
stabilizes
stabilizes about halfway through the simulation,
simulation, the syssystem
tem prediction error remains roughly
roughly constant. After this
point, each
each of the nodes continues to refine its position, but
point,
the
the overall
overall sum
sum of these movements
movements yields
yields little change in
the prediction error.
error. While the system under attack may
the
initially start
start with similar prediction errors since
since nodes are
initially
initially placed
placed at the origin,
origin, it is
is never able to effectively
effectively
initially
refine its
its coordinates
coordinates and achieve
achieve the desired
desired low estimation
refine
error found
found in
in the non-attack scenario.
scenario. As the percentage of
error
attackers increases,
increases, the
the ability of the system to accurately
attackers
estimate latency significantly
significantly degrades.
degrades.
estimate
Similar trends
trends are
are also
also evident in Fig.
Fig. 3,
3, where the sysSimilar
tem can
can be seen
seen to
to stabilize
stabilize at a much higher relative error
tem
than the
the baseline
baseline of one.
one. Having even
even a small percentage of
than
attackers incurs
incurs double
double or triple the estimation error when
attackers
compared with the non-malicious
non-malicious scenario.
scenario. Malicious
Malicious nodes
compared
have aa greater negative impact on the lower error nodes, as
have
can been seen
seen from
from the
the higher relative errors in Fig. 3(a) and
can
3(b) than in Fig.
Fig. 3(c).
3(c). When a low error node moves
Fig. 3(b)
Fig.
in response to
to malicious
malicious data,
data, it is
is prone to make large,
large, erin
roneous changes
changes to
to its
its own position and experience
experience a higher
roneous
estimation error.
error.
estimation
I m p a c t of attacks
a t t a c k s on
o n different network topologies.
Impact
We examine
examine the impact of the attacks on different
different network
We
topologies with different
different sizes
sizes and variabilities by using three
topologies
sets. Fig.
Fig. 66 shows
shows the relative error for
representative data sets.
sets when
when f=30%
f=30% of the nodes are
are malicious.
malicious. Each
these data sets
of the
the topologies
topologies is
is adversely
adversely effected,
effected, with the King data
of
6(a)) showing
showing the
the greatest degradation in accuracy
set (Fig.
(Fig. 6(a))
set
due to
to the
the fact
fact its
its has more
more variation in RTT and is prone to
due
excessive over
over and
and under estimation in response to an attack.
excessive

~7r 2(~
l\~dY) -j!ke _~2
JZ;; 0

JZr

We initially analytically selected a k of
of 1.5, in theory creating a threshold through which 53% of
of the coordinate updates would successfully pass. Through empirical testing of
of
over 200,000
200,000 coordinate updates over multiple
multiple simulations,
we found an ellipse determined by this threshold
threshold will allow
approximately 79%
79% of
of the updates to pass. This variation
variation
from the mathematically
mathematically derived value can be attributed
attributed to
the fact that the used metrics do not form a perfect normalized distribution and have a smaller variance than assumed
in Equation 6. A node may select smaller spatial threshold
threshold
values for stronger security guarantees, with the drawback
that it may find its coordinate less accurate to discarding
dates.
valid u
updates.
Fig. 7 presents the relative error for the King data set in
which the temporal outlier threshold was set to 4.0 and various spatial outlier detection threshold
threshold were tested. Table 2
presents corresponding false
false positive rate and median system prediction error for the different thresholds. Although
Although
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Figure 6:
Relative
error
under
30
percent
malicious
nodes
for
three
real-life
Internet
latency ddata
6:
30
a t a sets
by the brief
brief rise in error before coming back down), over
time the system is able to avoid many malicious updates.

Table
Table 2:
2: False
False Positive
Positive Rate
R a t e (Percentage) and
a n d Median
dian Prediction Error
E r r o r for
for Different Spatial Outlier
T
hresholds (King
(King
d a t a set)
set)
Thresholds
, a data
Spatial Outlier Threshold
% Mal
Mal.
1.75
2.00
Nodes
1.25
Nodes
1.25 1 1.50
1.50 1
1.75 1
28,
00
28. 16ms
16ms 1 21,
21. 16ms
16ms 1 17,16ms
17. 16ms 1 13,
13. 16ms
16ms
17,17ms 13, 18ms 10, 19ms 5,20ms
10
20
21, 18ms 15,21ms 7,23ms
6,26ms
27,20ms 11,22ms 1O,33ms 9,36ms
30
---

Table 3:
3: False Positive R
Rate
a t e (Percentage) aand
n d Median Prediction Error for Different D
Data
a t a Sets Using
A Spatial Outlier Threshold of
of 1.5
A
% Mal
Topology
AMP
King
Nodes Meridian
23,30ms 21, 18ms 21, 16ms
0
13,30ms 15,20ms 13, 18ms
10
12,32ms 14,25ms 15,21ms
20
11,40ms 12,36ms 11,22ms
30

--

higher thresholds provide
provide aa smaller
smaller false
false positive
positive rate,
rate, they
do
do induce
induce aa higher error rate.
rate. For example,
example, as
as malicious
nodes
nodes are
are introduced into
into the system,
system, a threshold of 2.00
maintains aa low
low false
false positive
positive rate with the trade-offs that
the
36ms, with 14ms
14ms more than
the prediction error raises
raises to
to 36ms,
the
the threshold
threshold of 1.5
1.5 which
which maintains a prediction error of
22ms,
22ms, when
when 30%
30% of the nodes
nodes are
are malicious.
malicious. We note that
virtual coordinate systems
systems are
are designed
designed to be long-running
service
service and
and hence
hence the
the presence of a small
small percentage of false
false
positive will
will not hinder the system.
system. Based on the results in
positive
Fig.
Fig. 77 and
and Table
Table 22 we conclude
conclude that a spatial threshold of
1.5 worked
worked well
well for
for different
different percentages of attackers
attackers while
1.5
having an
an acceptable
acceptable false
false positive
positive rate.
having

Different network topologies.
topologies. Fig. 8 and Table 3 show
the results for the King, Meridian and AMP topologies with
and without outlier detection, where the attack scenario is
4.2. Applying the spatial
the same as the one in Section 4.2.
threshold of 1.5
1.5 which was tested on the King data set, we
find our solution is able to mitigate the system instability
instability in
all three data sets. The King data set (Fig. 8(a))
8(a)) maintains
a low relative error for various percentages of
of the attackers.
We also note it is able to maintain
maintain a low system predicof false positives (Table 3). In
tion error and low number of
Table 3,
3, the less the system prediction error increased with
the number of attackers,
attackers, the more resiliently the system performed under attack. Similar trends can also be observed
4.4 Mitigating Attacks
Attacks Against Virtual CoorCoor4.4
for the Meridian data set (Fig. 8(b)).
8(b)). While our solution
dinate Systems
Systems
dinate
is able to offer protection to the smaller scale AMP data
In this section
section we demonstrate
demonstrate the effectiveness
effectiveness of our
set from malicious nodes, it can be seen from Fig. 8(c)
8(c) that
In
defense mechanisms
mechanisms at mitigating the effects
effects of malicious
defense
larger percentages of
of malicious begin to overwhelm the system. This occurs since the percentage of
nodes and
and sustaining the usability
usability of the system.
system.
of malicious nodes is
nodes
a n d deflation attacks. We begin by re-examining high (2
Inflation and
(?: 30%),
30%), each benign node will have many malicious
reference set members.
node, this
the inflation
inflation and deflation
deflation attacks against
members. For example, given that 30% of
of the
the
a victim node,
"
total nodes are malicious, the probability
time with aa system
system using
using our defense
defense mechanisms.
mechanisms. The victime
probability that at least 30%
tim node
node is
is able
able to
to identify
identify and mitigate the effect
effect of the
tim
of the nodes in a reference set of
of AMP are also malicious is
malicious nodes,
nodes, achieving
achieving aa prediction error of 11ms,
llms, as
malicious
about 67%.
67%. This is nearly double the probability
probability for King
shown in
in Fig.
Fig. 4.
4. The
The error is
is similar
similar to a system under nonshown
or Meridian under the same conditions due to AMP'S
AMP's much
attack conditions
conditions (lOms),
(lorn), and nearly
nearly six
six times less than the
smaller size (see
(see Table 1).
1).
attack
Malicious coalition size tolerated by outlier detecunprotected system.
system.
tion. All defense mechanisms and protocols resilient to inDifferent percentage of malicious nodes. Fig. 7
Different
siders have limitations regarding the number
presents the
the relative
relative error for
for the King data set for
for differnumber of
of attackers
they can tolerate. We analyze the number of
ent percentages
percentages of malicious
malicious nodes.
nodes. Note that for
for a spatial
ent
of malicious colluding nodes that can be tolerated by our outlier
threshold of 1.5,
1.5, our solution
solution mitigates the system instabiloutlier detection
detection
mechanism.
ity caused
caused by the
the malicious
malicious nodes
nodes and even helps
helps the syssysity
mechanism. Table 4 presents the number of
of malicious nodes
in a reference set which by colluding can influence the spatem to
to stabilize
stabilize at aa more accurate
accurate local minimum than the
tial centroid calculation enough to allow the attack types
initial protocol
protocol design
design to
to tolerate
tolerate benign errors.
errors. While
While each
initial
discussed in Section 2.3
node may
may occasionally
occasionally accept
accept erroneous
erroneous data from
from malicious
malicious
2.3 to bypass the detection mechanism.
Nearly twenty malicious nodes (or 30% of
due to
to aa short
short temporal history or a skewed
skewed spatial
nodes due
of the reference set
size) are required for nearly all of
history with updates from
from only a few
few nodes
nodes (as
(as can be seen
size)
history
of the identified attack types
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Figure 7: Relative error under different percentage of attackers using different spatial outlier thresholds with
t h e King data
d a t a set
the

third of the total number of nodes in the reference set.
set. This
bound is in line with the requirements of other methods that
insiders.
tolerate malicious insiders.
defense mechanisms
mechanisms do not inSystem overhead. Our defense
troduce any extra link stress since they utilize information
that is already being exchanged
exchanged between nodes.
nodes. The memory utilization for spatial correlation requires
requires maintaining
the most recent u updates. In the case of the temporal
consists of maintainoutlier detection, the memory usage consists
ing the temporal centroid. By incrementally updating the
centroid, we do not need to maintain the entire history for
each probed node but only need to store the mean, standard
deviation, and count for each of the metrics. The additional
computational complexity
complexity is bound by the number of nodes
in the reference
reference set which is constant.
constant. The computation
of the temporal outliers is a constant time calculation performed for each of the nodes when deciding
deciding to update its
coordinate. The calculation of the spatial correlation is also
computed in constant time.

Table 4: N
Number
u m b e r of Colluding Nodes Tolerated by
Spatial Outlier Detection for Different Data
D a t a Sets Using
1.5 (Reference set
i n g A Spatial Outlier Threshold of 1.5
size is 64)
64)

II
Attack Type
Inflation
Deflation
Oscillation
Oscillation

Data Set
King
19.7
20.2
19.6

Meridian
21.6
19.8
20.3

AMP
19.8
12.6
19.3

across the three data sets. The deflation
deflation attack is more sucsucacross
since the RTTs are less variable and the vircessful for AMP since
l(c))
(Fig. 1(c))
tual coordinate system creates one main cluster (Fig.
nodes. This also explains why high
that contains all of the nodes.
(230%)
30%) were able to overpercentages of malicious
malicious nodes G::
scenarios. In these cases,
cases,
whelm our solution in the AMP scenarios.
the benign nodes were likely to have twenty or more maliset, which can cause the spatial
cious nodes in their reference set,
allow malicious updates to pass undecentroid to shift and allow
tected. We conclude
conclude that our defense
defense method works
works well
when the size of the malicious
malicious coalition
coalition is smaller
smaller than one

5. RELATED WORK
section, we review previous work in three areas:
areas:
In this section,
Attacks in virtual coordinate systems. One of the
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Figure
8:
Relative
error
under
different
percentage
of
attackers
using
a
spatial
outlier
of 1.5 w
with
percentage
a t t a c k e r s u s i n g a s p a t i a l o u t l i e r tthreshold
h r e s h o l d of
ith
F i g u r e 8: R e l a t i v e e r r o r u n d e r
three
t h r e e real-life Internet
I n t e r n e t latency
l a t e n c y data
d a t a sets
sets
correlation tto
misinformation being injected into the
o detect misinformation
sensor streams. In our work, the correlation is incorporated
incorporated
in-line with the coordinate computation and analysis is perperformed on real Internet data sets.

few
few systems
systems to
t o consider actual
actual malicious
malicious behavior is the PIC
PIC
[12]
[12] virtual coordinate system which uses a security test
based on
on the
the triangle inequality. Any node which violates
the
the triangle inequality
inequality above some margin of error is ignored
and
and designated
designated as
as malicious.
malicious. However, it has been shown in
[23,
[23, 24,
24, 25]
251 that RTT measurements often violate this inequality
equality and
and thus solutions
solutions based solely on such inequalities
may
may degrade
degrade system
system performance when no attack is occurring.
120, 21]
211 the
the authors
authors demonstrate the susceptibility
ring. In [20,
of
of the
the Vivaldi
Vivaldi to
t o attacks.
attacks. However, no solution is proposed.
Coordinate
C o o r d i n a t e system
s y s t e m error
e r r o r and
a n d landmark
l a n d m a r k selection.
An important area of research orthogonal to
t o the security of
the
t h e system
system is
is the
the minimization of error in the system. The
accuracy
accuracy of such
such systems is
is greatly effected by landmark
placement for
for centralized schemes and neighbor selection in
decentralized
[47], it is shown that a hierardecentralized schemes.
schemes. In [47],
chical
chical approach can lead to better performance over nonhierarchical solutions.
solutions. Work such as
as [25]
[25] and [48]
[48] demonhierarchical
strate shortcomings
shortcomings of current systems and propose possible
strate
new metrics and
and measurements to
t o more accurately embed
new
the
t h e distance in the
the coordinate system. These areas provide
interesting
interesting opportunities for
for further research since our work
could possibly leverage these new metrics to
t o place further
could
constraints on
on the
the attackers and create a more robust, acconstraints
curate,
curate, and fault-tolerant system.
system.
U s e of
o f spatial
s p a t i a l and
a n d temporal
t e m p o r a l correlations. Recently
Use
t h e benefits
benefits of the
the Mahalanobis distance for statistical anomthe
aly detection have been demonstrated
demonstrated in the context of netaly
[40,49].
[49], the authors
authors present
work intrusion detection [40,
49]. In [49],
of~detection
aa comparative study of
detection schemes based on data
mining techniques for
for network based intrusion detection. In
mining
[40]the
the authors
authors discuss
discuss an
a n unsupervised, payload-based net[40]
anomalv detector based on the Mahalanobis distance
work anomaly
was used to
to detect attacks
attacks like worms.
which was
Spatial and
and temporal correlations
correlations were previously used
Spatial
in the
the context of network security. A notable work in this
in
[44] where authors
authors use temporal and spatial coraspect is
is [44]
aspect
relations to
t o trace back attacks
attacks and detect attack scenarios,
relations
using aa large amount of information from
from intrusion detecusing
tion systems,
systems, firewalls,
firewalls, and different software logs. Unlike
tion
[44],which was more general,
general, our work fot h e approach in [44],
the
cuses on
on virtual coordinate systems.
systems.
cuses
Correlations have also
also been used in wireless networks for
Correlations
t h e detection of attacks
attacks [50,
[50, 51].
511. The work in [50]
[50] uses correthe
lations between different features to
t o identify attacks against
lations
hoc routing protocols while the work in [51]
[51]
wireless ad
ad hoc
wireless
shows how to
t o augment sensor networks with spatio-temporal
spatio-temporal
shows

6. CONCLUSION
of
In this paper we studied attacks against tthe
h e accuracy of
virtual coordinate systems. We classified the attacks as cco-e
ordinate inflation, deflation and oscillation
oscillation and showed that
even a small number of
of attackers can severely degrade cco-e
ordinate accuracy due do the epidemic nature of
of the attacks. We proposed tto
o use spatial-temporal correlation tto
o
received from malicious
perform outlier detection on metrics received
nodes and eliminate them from the coordinate computamethods we
tion process. By using analytical and empirical methods
found that a spatial temporal of
of 1.5 and a temporal
temporal threshthreshold of 4 produced a low system error and maintained aan
n
acceptable false positive rate. Finally, we examined the limitations of outlier detection when a significant
significant percentage of
of
nodes are malicious and found tthat
h a t the method starts degrading when more than 30% of
of the nodes in a reference set
form a malicious coalition.
between refFuture work includes analyzing the relation between
erence set size and the system size and the effect of
of our
mechanisms on upper level applications using virtual cooro estimate network measurements.
dinate systems tto
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